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The past two decades in America have witnessed a resurgence of interest
in religious-based schooling. Manifestations of this trend are evident in the
increased number of primary and secondary students enrolled in religious
schools and the rapidity with which new church-affiliated schools are be-
ing opened. This growth is even more remarkable considering that the
number of school-age children in the United States has declined since
1971, a trend that is expected to continue through 1985.' Thus, in a period
when public school enrollments were declining, private school enrollments
increased and are predicted to continue to rise at least through 1989-as
far into the future as the National Center for Education Statistics has pro-
jected.' Compilations by the U.S. Department of Education for fall
semester 1980 showed that 10.8 percent of school-age children attended
nongovernment schools, of which 84 percent (9.1 percent overall) are
religious schools.' Conservative forecasts are that private school enroll-
ment will reach 12.5 percent of the school-age population by 1988,
although other estimates range as high as 20 percent.' The expected
* Assistant Professor of Education, Buena Vista College; B.S. Ed., 1967 and M.A., 1974,
Northeast Missouri State University; Ph.D., 1984, University of Missouri-Columbia.
** Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia; B.S., 1971, Iowa State University; J.D.,
1974, Cornell University.
Doyle, A Din of Inequity: Private Schools Reconsidered, 18 AM. EDUC. 11 (1982).
U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Educational Statistics, THE CONDITION OF
EDUCATION 56 (1980 edition).
' U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Educational Statistics, THE CONDITION OF
EDUCATION 15-16 (1983 edition).
' Carper, The Christian Day School Movement, 47 THE EDUC. FORUM 135, 138-139 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Carper]; Cooper, McLaughlin & Manno, The Latest Word on Private School
Growth, 85 TEACHER'S COLLEGE REC. 88-98 (1983); U.S. Department of Education, National Center
for Educational Statistics, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 56 (1980 edition).
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increase is due almost entirely to higher enrollment in conservative Protes-
tant schools.'
Concurrent with this increased parental interest in religious-based
education has been a shift toward privatism in politics;6 growth in liber-
tarian thinking;' a widening perception that the public schools no longer
operate within the context of a nondenominational "Christian consen-
sus";' and a budding conviction that no overarching world view or civic
faith presently exists in American society that the common schools can
confidently draw upon for the values to be fostered in their students. 9
One of the many consequences of these sociopolitical undercurrents has
I It is difficult to obtain accurate enrollment figures on the Christian day school movement of
conservative Protestant churches. Some of the schools are so vigorous in their opposition to govern-
ment involvement that they refuse to participate even in enrollment reporting requirements of state
agencies. Using the best available data, James C. Carper estimates that these schools number bet-
ween 9,000 and 11,000 with a student population of one million. The most dramatic figures on the
rapid growth of Christian day schools can be seen in figures provided by the two principal
evangelical school associations.
The Western Association of Christian Schools, which in 1978 merged with two smaller
organizations-the National Christian School Educational Association and Ohio Associa-
tion of Christian Schools-to form the Association of Christian Schools International,
claimed membership of 102 schools with an enrollment of 14,659 in 1967. By 1973 the
figures were 308 and 39,360 respectively, and in 1983 approximately 1,900 and 270,000.
The American Association of Christian Schools, a rival organization of a more separatist
nature, was founded in 1972 with eighty schools enrolling 16,000 students. In 1983 the
association claimed more than 1,100 schools with a student population in excess of
160,000.
Carper, supra note 4, at 136-139.
Selected enrollment trends for 1965-66 compared with periods 1975-76 and 1980-85 appear in the
table Appendix A. As the table indicates, Roman Catholic enrollment continues to fall while all
others increased during the twenty year period. The most dramatic increases occurred in Protestant
schools. These figures are based on a total private school enrollment of 4,961,755 in the fifty states
and the District of Columbia. In the same reporting period the public school enrollment was
45,945,848. U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Educational Statistics, THE CONDI-
TION OF EDUCATION 15-16 (1983 edition).
6 R. BUTTS, THE REVIVAL OF CIVIC LEARNING: A RATIONALE FOR CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN
AMERICAN SCHOOLS 1-23 (1980).
Rich, The Libertarian Challenge to Public Education, 46 THE EDUC. FORUM 421 (1982).
8 Carper, supra note 4, at 139.
See Michaelsen, Is the Public School Religious or Secular?, THE RELIGION OF THE REPUBLIC 22
(1971) (J. Wilson, ed.). See also R. MCCARTHY, J. SKILLEN & W. HARPER, DISESTABLISHMENT A SE-
COND TIME: GENUINE PLURALISM FOR AMERICAN SCHOOLS 4-14, 48-51, 92 (1982). The basic argument
of these authors begins with the truism that responsible education is inherently value-laden. All
agree that government has a responsibility to educate its citizens. However, government, at least
liberal government, should not, through the control of schools, impose on students an ideology on
which there is no broad public consensus. If the inculcation of values lies initially and principally
with parents, then parents must be able to choose free of economic coercion the type of educational
philosophy desired for their children. This point and a belief (hotly contested!) that civic consensus
is narrow in America, leads one to accept some form of government assistance to parents (or, at
least low-income parents who cannot presently afford private schools), including those who choose
religious schools. Id. at 91-106, 124-136.
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been an insistence by private school parents on the right to educate their
children free of "discriminatory" funding arrangements, meaning the
freedom to choose a nongovernment school without having to pay both
taxes and tuition. This climate of thought coupled with enrollment shifts
to private schools has resulted in an increasing number of spokespersons
stepping forward to advocate the use of government funds for private
education. Moreover, because the funding debate may no longer be cut
short by characterizing it as simply a "Catholic issue," the movement
has broader "political clout" at election time.
Arguments in favor of such funding have been calculated to circum-
vent the separation of church and state issue. In the name of equity,
distributive justice, parental choice, educational freedom, healthy com-
petition, consumerism, and the richness of a diverse or pluralistic educa-
tional system, proponents have called for legislation that would fund
"free choice," "education" or "students," as distinct from "church-
related" or "parochial" institutions. In such arrangements, funds would
not go directly to nongovernment schools, but to parents via some form
of tax benefit or educational voucher.' 0 A voucher plan attracts addi-
tional proponents as a free market approach to school reform. I I Ad-
vocates of aid for private education have had their aspirations raised to
new heights by the Reagan administration's tuition tax credit plan,' 2 and
more recently a proposed voucher system.' 3
,0 See J. CATrERALL, EDUCATION VOUCHERS (1984); Herdon, Tuition Tax Credits and Educa-
tional Vouchers, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 207 (1984, J. Carper & T. Hunt eds.); J. CAT-
TERALL, TUITION TAX CREDITS: FACT AND FICTION (1983); Davis, Educational Vouchers: Bloom or
Blunder? 47 THE EDUC. FORUM 161 (1983); Puckett, Educational Vouchers: Rhetoric and Reality,
48 THE EDUC. FORUM 7 (1983); J. COONS & S. SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE: THE CASE FOR
FAMILY CONTROL (1978).
Ross, Tuition Aid: From Tax Credits to Vouchers? 80 LIBERTY 27 (July/August 1985).
2 In President Reagan's first term several bills pertaining to tuition tax credits were introduced.
The major ones were H.R. 6701 and S. 2673, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). In 1983 Reagan recom-
mended a tuition tax credit plan under his Educational Opportunity and Equity Act. Basically, the
plan provided for an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code to allow a person to claim credit for
fifty percent of the tuition for full-time elementary or secondary school enrollment of a taxpayer's
dependent attending a private school. The credit for each child was limited to $100 in 1983, $200 in
1984, and $300 in 1985 and each year thereafter. S. 2673.
Reagan's proposal, in a form slightly amended by the Senate Finance Committee, was brought up
on the floor November 16, 1983. The bill came up late in the session on a parliamentary maneuver
that sought to attach it to a measure already passed by the House. The motion to do so was tabled
by a vote of 59 to 38. See Should Congress Enact Legislation to Provide Tax Credits for Nonpublic
School Tuition? Pro & Con, 63 CONG. DIG. 3 (1984).
Although S. 2673 failed and H.R. 6701 was not acted on, Secretary of Education, William J. Ben-
nett, and Reagan have said that a tuition tax crddit bill is forthcoming this session. See Educating
Souls: Bennett Promotes Parochial Schools, 38 CHURCH & STATE 125 (1985); Editorials, 38 CHURCH
& STATE 15 (1985).
" The Equity and Choice Act of 1985 (TEACH), H.R. 3821, 99th Cong, 1st Sess. (1985). The
bill provides low-income parents of educationally deprived children receiving remedial education
October 19851
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Opponents of nongovernment school funding argue against it on
several grounds. It is an unwise use of scarce tax funds claim critics. It
militates against the public school-the great common denominator and
cohesive factor in American society; it violates the establishment clause
of the first amendment' 4 by advancing religion. Moreover, opponents
say, public aid to non-government schools serves only a small minority of
the population; it results in an educational system based on social
class-a public one for the poor, handicapped, and disadvantaged, and a
private elitist one for the rest; and, finally, it will destroy the uniqueness
and diversity of private schools through the regulation that inevitably ac-
companies government funding.' 5
The latter contention is the immediate focus here. Putting aside ques-
tions as to the sincerity of their concern, are opponents of funding for
nongovernment schools correct when they postulate that public aid will
necessarily result in regulation that will in time destroy the diversity and
philosophical character of private education, especially the religious com-
ponent of church-related schools? Although the precise contours of the
law are still unclear, the courts have construed the first amendment as
prohibiting states, in the exercise of their general police power over
education, from unduly encroaching on the operation of religious
schools. Thus, although a state may regulate health, fire, and safety mat-
ters at private schools' 6 and ensure that these schools provide their
with a voucher redeemable at public and private schools, including religious schools. The voucher
will be equal to the approximate amount a school spends to put a child through the Chapter I pro-
gram. See ch. 1 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, 20 U.S.C. § 3801 et
seq. (Supp. 1 1985). Participating schools will be required to not discriminate on the basis of race,
color or national origin. However, other civil rights legislation is circumvented by means of the bill's
declaration that a private school's redemption of vouchers does not constitute receipt of "Federal
financial assistance." See infra text accompanying notes 87-99.
" U.S. CONST. amend. 1. The establishment and free exercise clauses together read: "Congress
shall make r o law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ..
Id.
's Hollings, The Case Against Tuition Tax Credits, 65 NATIONAL ASSN. OF SECONDARY SCHOOL
PRINCIPALS BULLETIN 77 (1981); Hoogenstyn, The Dangers of Using Public Funds for Private and
Parochial Schools, 197 THE CHURCHMAN 12 (1983); T. JAMES & H. LEVIN, eds., PUBLIC DOLLARS
FOR PRIVATE SCHOOLS: THE CASE OF TUITION TAX CREDITS (1983) (twelve of the thirteen contributors
oppose or express reservations about tuition tax credits; Nathan Glazer being the exception); Should
Congress Enact Legislation to Provide Tax Credits for Nonpublic School Tuition? Pro & Con, 63
CONG. DIG. 10 (1984); Warner, Where there is No Vision: The Death of Public and Private Educa-
tion in America, 49 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 215 (1983).
" Courts have upheld more stringent building and fire codes for churches using their facilities as
private schools, in contrast to churches using facilities solely for religious purposes. See, e.g., Faith
Assembly of God of South Dennis and Hyannis, Inc. v. State Bldg. Code Comm'n, 81 Mass. App.
Ct. 297, 416 N.E.2d 228 (1981); Hough v. North Star Baptist Church, 109 Mich. App. 780, 312
N.W.2d 158 (1981); State Fire Marshal v. Lee, 101 Mich. App. 829, 300 N.W.2d 748 (1980).
Reasonable, nondiscriminatory zoning requirements for church-related schools have also been sus-
tained. Compare Seward Chapel, Inc. v. City of Seward, 655 P.2d 1293 (Alaska 1982) (zoning or-
[Vol. 14, No. 4
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students a minimal education so that pupils may come to function as
literate and productive citizens,' 7 the state cannot dictate a curriculum
that renders the nongovernment schools almost indistinguishable from
the public schools.' 8 The question as yet unanswered is whether the ac-
ceptance by religious schools of state or federal funds lowers this first
amendment barrier, thereby enabling government to assert even greater
control over these schools by virtue of the proverbial "strings" attached
to the aid.' 9
Many who answer this question in the affirmative reflect a deep-seated
pragmatism that says whenever government pays for an activity, it con-
dinance upheld) with City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash.2d 1, 639 P.2d 1358 (1982)
.(ordinance struck down where church-sponsored school could not afford to comply and would have
to close).
" Compare Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245-46 (1968) ("[A] substantial body of case
law has confirmed the power of the States to insist that attendance at private schools, if it is to
satisfy state compulsory-attendance laws, be at institutions which provide minimum hours of in-
struction, employ teachers of specified training, and cover prescribed subjects of instruction.");
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (states have power to reasonably "regulate all
schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all
children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and
patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and
that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare;" but due process violated
when state orders all.private schools closed); and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923)
(government has strong interest in competency of students in English language, but means chosen to
accomplish that task violated due process) with Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (Old
Order Amish excused from compulsory education law by free exercise clause where public education
would endanger separatistic way of life).
" State accreditation and regulation of primary and secondary religious schools was successfully
resisted as violative of the first amendment in Bangor Baptist Church v. Maine Dep't of Educ. and
Cultu'ral Services, 576 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Me. 1983); Kentucky State Bd. of Elem. & Secondary
Educ. v. Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1979). cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980); State ex rel. Nagel
v. Olin, 64 Ohio St.2d 341, 415 N.E.2d 279 (1980); State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St.2d 181, 351 N.E.2d
750 (1975); Vermont v. La Barge, 134 Vt. 276, 357 A.2d 121 (1976). State accreditation and teacher
certification statutes were found constitutional in Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, __ F.
Supp. - (S.D. Iowa 1985); Johnson v. Charles City Comm. Schools Bd., 368 N.W.2d 74 (Iowa
1985); cert. denied, Pruessner v. Benton, 54 U.S.L.W. __ (U.S. Dec. 16, 1985) (No. 85-671); Sheridan
Road Baptist Church v. Michigan Dep't of Educ., 132 Mich. App. I, 348 N.W.2d 263, lev. to app.
denied, 419 Mich. 916 (1984); State ex rel. Kandt v. North Platte Baptist Church, 216 Neb. 684, 345
N.W.2d 19, cert. denied, - U.S. __ , 105 S. Ct. 428 (1984); State ex rel. Douglas v. Faith Baptist
Church, 207 Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d 571, appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 803 (1981); State v. Shaver, 294
N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1980). See generally Erikson, Bad Fences Make Bad Neighbors: A Look at State
Regulation of Private Schools, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 227 (1984, J. Carper & T. Hunt,
eds.); Note, State Regulation of Private Religious Schools and the State's Interest in Education, 25
ARIZ. L. REV. 123 (1983); Note, State Regulation of Private Religious Schools in North Carolina-A
Model Approach, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 405 (1980); Comment, The State and Sectarian Educa-
tion: Regulation to Deregulation, 1980 DUKE L.J. 801.
" See Dayton Christian Schools v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, prob. juris. noted, 54 U.S.L.W.
3323 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1985) (No. 85-488), holding that a state law against sex discrimination in
employment could not apply to a fundamentalist Christian school's refusal to rehire a female
teacher for becoming pregnant. In dicta, the circuit court said that less restrictive means may be
constitutionally permissable to force compliance with the employment discrimination law, such as
October 19851
HeinOnline  -- 14 J.L. & Educ. 557 1985
558 Journal of Law & Education
currently acquires the authority to regulate it. Dispositive of the matter
for many is the quip, "If you don't want the regulation, then don't take
the money." Indeed, all would agree that it would be irresponsible for
government to fund an activity and not exercise the requisite control to
ensure that the money is spent for the designated public purpose. As one
commentator has said, "It [government] must also take some steps to en-
sure that the aid is used for the purposes intended. This means in a word,
'regulation,' the inevitable concomitant of public financial support." 2"
However, the sort of administrative oversight of concern here goes
beyond the obligatory financial audit. Senator Mattingly, in the debate
over the Reagan administration's proposed tuition tax credit bill, stated
the issue more poignantly:
There is one aspect of the tuition tax debate that puzzles me. I cannot under-
stand why private schools would want to take on the burden of the Federal
regulatory process. And Federal regulation of private schools is inevitable if tui-
tion tax credits become law.2'
Given the growing number of proponents for aid to private schools
and the possibility that such funding may become an inroad to eventual
government control of religious schools, two other matters should be
drawn into the debate: current events in Spain, France, and Malta con-
cerning the regulation of religious schools, and recent developments in
the case law of the United States Supreme Court where the spending and
taxing power of Congress clashes with first amendment freedoms.
II. European Patterns
Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of the Socialist Party in Spain was
elected to power in 1982. As part of his program, often dubbed the
"Spanish New Deal," Gonzalez proposed the Law of the Right to
Educate, by which he sought to reduce the influence of the Roman
Catholic Church on the educational system.12 Nongovernment schools in
Spain are predominantly Roman Catholic and educate approximately
three million of the eight million students (37.5 percent). According to
proponents of the legislation, the Catholic school system was pervaded
by "discrimination, obscurantism, and indoctrination," especially during
withdrawing school bus transportation for students, withholding textbooks, speech and hearing
diagnostic services, physician, nursing, dental and optometric services, and denying tax exempt
status to the school. 766 F.2d at 955.
20 Finn, Public Support for Private Education, Part 1, 18 AM. EDUC. 4, 5-6 (1982).
Mattingly, Should Congress Enact Legislation to Provide Tax Credits for Nonpublic School
Tuition? Pro & Con, 63 CONG. DIG. 10, 31 (1984).
22 UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, Dec. 3, 4, 1983 (available on the computerized research service
DIALOG) [hereinafter cited as UPI].
[Vol. 14, No. 4
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the rule of Dictator Francisco Franco that ended with his death in 1975.3
The private school system was supported by state subsidies and enjoyed
considerable educational autonomy. 24 To rectify what the socialists
perceived as a problem and in turn to ensure free basic education for all
children, 25 the government proposed to "standardize" the schools. That
is, Gonzalez sought to reduce and eventually eliminate the differences
between Spain's public and private schools.26
Many in the Spanish population, ninety-five percent of which are
members of the Roman Catholic Church, 27 protested with demonstra-
tions and petitions maintaining that the proposal would create a
monolithic educational system, infringe on freedom of religion, violate
the Constitution's guarantee of freedom of education, and give the state
too much control over teaching.28 Nevertheless, in March, 1984, the
socialist majority in the Congress of Deputies passed the law without dif-
ficulty.29
The Law of the Right to Educate requires all nongovernment schools
receiving state funds:
(1) to have their curricula approved by the government;
(2) to be governed by a council of teachers, parents, and students with the
authority to select the principal of the school;
(3) to make attendance at religious classes optional with each student; and
(4) to make the schools tuition-free within three years.3"
The new legislation took effect as schools opened in the fall of 1984.
Opposition groups held mass demonstrations, the largest since the
socialists came to power. Despite stiff resistance by parents, opposition
parties, and the Catholic Church, the Minister of Education announced
that the government would not relent from its effort to put in place free
"democratic education." 3' Both the Catholic Church and an opposition
party filed legal appeals with Spain's highest court, the Constitutional
Tribunal, that sought to overturn the legislation as violative of religious
freedom.32 In June 1985 the court sustained the constitutionality of the
11 REUTERS NORTH EUROPEAN SERVICE, July 25, 1983 (available on the computerized research
service NEXIS) [hereinafter cited as REUTERS].
UPI, Sept. 26, 1983; REUTERS, Mar. 18, 1984.
REUTERS, July 25, 1983.
20 REUTERS, Dec. 17, 1983 and Feb. 25, 1984.
17 UPI, Sept. 26, 1983.
5' UPI, Feb. 25 and Mar. 15, 16, 1984.
2' UPI, Mar. 15, 16, 1984; N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, at L7, col. 5.
'0 REUTERS, Feb. 25 and Mar. 16, 1984; UPI Feb. 25, 1984; N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1984, at L7,
col. 5.
' REUTERS, Nov. 18, 19, 1984.
3 REUTERS, Oct. 11 and Nov. 18, 1984.
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statute."
Similar legislation was under way in France, but the effort is presently
stalled due to public and political party opposition. When the Socialist
Party came to power in 1981 under President Francois Mitterand, it
sought to implement an election promise to create a "single, unified, lay
education system" 3 -a means toward reducing the influence of Roman
Catholic schools that socialists regard as bastions of economic and social
conservatism.35 Ninety-three percent of France's nongovernment schools
are Catholic.36 Legislation was immediately proposed to repeal the ex-
isting laws whereby nongovernment schools negotiated their subsidies
with the state and yet enjoyed minimal regulation.37 The proposed
legislation embodies four major points:
(1) it sets limits on the number of teaching positions in private schools;
(2) it requires that private school teachers become civil servants;3"
(3) it brings the budgets of private schools under regional government con-
trol; and
(4) it makes private school administration subject to governmental review.39
Noncompliance would result in loss of government funds.
Although only 15 percent (in contrast to 37.5 percent in Spain) of
France's children are educated in nongovernment schools,"0 a furious
round of protest was raised by clerics and opposition political parties.
Central to the resistance is a belief that such a move is the first step
toward integration of the public and private educational systems and as
such violates fundamental rights-primarily freedom of education for
children, freedom of choice for parents, and freedom of the Catholic
Church to teach children and to manage its schools."
Opponents of the proposed legislation organized mass demonstrations,
the size of which had not been seen in France since the student uprisings
11 REUTERS, June 27, 1985. The Constitutional Tribunal did overturn three articles of the legisla-
tion that required those operating a private school to submit a definition of the school's character
for the approval of government officials. Id.
REUTERS, June 25, 1984; UPI, June 25, 1984.
" UPI, Feb. 25, 1984; N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1984, at A3, col. 4. Teachers in the state schools are
staunch supporters of the socialist program. Concerning protesters against the proposed legislation,
one government teacher is quoted as saying, "These are mainly well-off people proclaiming the right
to freedom, but who are trying to cushion their children by sending them to schools where there is
less social tension, with fewer immigrants and less political activity." UPI, Feb. 25,1984.
" N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1984, at A3, col. 2; UPI, June 24, 1984.
REUTERS, Feb. 25, 1984.
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 25, 1984, at 8, col. 1.
REUTERS, Feb. 29, 1984; N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1984, at A3, col. 4 and Apr. 19, 1984, at A3,
col. 2.
UPI, Feb. 25 and July 18, 1984.
UPI, Jan. 28 (family rights) and Feb. 25, 1984; REUTERS, Mar. 4, 1984; N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5,
1984, at A3, col. 4 (right to teach).
[Vol. 14, No. 4
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in the late 1960's and the Allied liberation in 1944.42 The demonstrations
coupled with maneuvering by the political opposition, division within the
Socialist Party,4 3 and erosion of popular support for the socialists,
resulted in Mitterand's withdrawal of the controversial legislation in July
1984. 1 Nonetheless, the issue remained alive. President Mitterand an-
nounced that he would submit the legislation to popular referendum if
voters first approved an amendment to the Constitution that would per-
mit a plebiscite on issues affecting individual liberties. 5 In late summer
1984, the combined forces of the French communists and conservative
parties tied up the constitutional amendment in the Senate where the
socialists do not hold a majority.4 6
The situation in the tiny Mediterranean island-nation of Malta has
many similarities to what has transpired in Spain and France; however,
the situation is more advanced and the church-state clash more heated.
Once again a socialist government, in this instance the Labor Party that
assumed power in 1971, has sought to reduce the influence of the Roman
Catholic Church.4 7 Despite the population of 400,000 being ninety per-
cent Roman Catholic, 8 Prime Minister Dom Mintoff has attacked the
Church as "anachronistic, money grabbing, and over mighty." 9 Mintoff
set out to loosen the Catholic hold on nongovernment education by alter-
ing how the Church funds its elementary and secondary schools. In 1977
the government ceased direct subsidies to nongovernment schools,5" and
in 1980 Mintoff discontinued government grants to private school
students. 5
For the next two years religious schools continued to operate by charg-
ing tuition. Mintoff responded by unfurling the populist appeal that "all
education must be free." 52 So long as the religious schools charged tui-
tion, they were viewed as "a source of social injustice since they cater only
, UPI, Feb. 25 and June 24, 1984; N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1984, at A3, col. 4.
UPI, Feb. 25, 1984.
4 UPI, July 12, 17, 1984.
, UPI, July 20, 1984. See generally, Notes On Church-State Affairs (France), 27 J. OF CHURCH
& STATE 150, 152 (1985).
" UPI, Aug. 7, 8, 1984 (the Communist Party opposed the proposal because in their view the
socialist had not gone far enough in creating a single, unified educational system). For a brief
history of the situation in France by one sympathetic to the position of the Socialist Party, see
Fowler, The "French Connection ": Public funding of private schools has been tried in France-and
failed, 3 NEA TODAY 9 (May 1985).
" Notes On Church-State Affairs (Malta), 25 J. OF CHURCH & STATE 579, 585 (1983).
" School's Out: Mintoff takes on an old enemy, TIME MAGAZINE 43 (Sept. 24, 1984); N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 5, 1984, at A9, col. 5.
REUTERS, Oct. 13, 1983.
REUTERS, Oct. 11, 1984.
" Id.
, Notes on Church-State Affairs (Malta), 25 J. OF CHURCH & STATE 579, 585 (1983).
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to those who can pay." 53 Having wrapped itself in this equalitarian ban-
ner, in 1982 the Labor Party froze private school tuition at existing
levels. Additionally, the government gave graduates of state-operated
secondary schools an admission preference over Catholic school students
at the University of Malta, the nation's only school of higher
education.54 Anticipating that parents would respond to the tuition freeze
with donations to religious schools to keep them in operation, a directive
forbade private contributions until the fee system was abolished."
In May 1984, Mintoff decreed that religious schools would not be per-
mitted to charge any tuition as of the next school year beginning in Oc-
tober. The government also revoked the licenses of eight church-operated
academies and announced the opening of four state-operated
substitutes. 6 The Minister of Education defended the move by insisting
that the Church was wealthy enough to operate the schools without
charging tuition or fees.57 The Roman Catholic Archbishop to Malta,
Joseph Mercieca, denied that the Church could provide free education
and protested that if the tuition ban were allowed to stand, "education
will surrender to indoctrination. 58
In September 1984, when the eight Roman Catholic academies reopened
in defiance of the state, Mintoff ordered them closed and placed them
under police guard.5 9 The Church reacted to the closings and the tuition
ban by ordering all other Catholic schools not to reopen in October as
scheduled. This caused more than 20,000 Catholic children, a third of the
Maltese student population, to be unable to begin classes.6" Because
education is compulsory in Malta, the parents of all 20,000 students were
thereby in mass civil disobedience.6 The government appeared to harden
its stand by threatening to "requisition" all the Catholic schools and
reopen them as state schools. 2 In November 1984, as an interim compro-
mise while talks continued, the Church agreed to provide tuition-free
schools through September 1985.63
11 N.Y. TIMES, OCt. 1, 1984, at A7, col. 1.
1" School's Out: Mintoff takes on an old enemy, TIME MAGAZINE 43 (Sept. 24, 1984); Notes On
Church-State Affairs (Malta), 25 J. OF CHURCH & STATE 579, 585 (1983).
11 REUTERS, Oct. 11, 1984; cf. Notes On Church-State Affairs (Malta), 25 J. OF CHURCH &
STATE 579, 585 (1983).
56 School's Out: Mintoff takes on an old enemy, TIME MAGAZINE 43 (Sept. 24, 1984); REUTERS,
Oct. 1, 1984.
" School's Out: Mintoff takes on an old enemy, TIME MAGAZINE 43 (Sept. 24, 1984).
Id. See generally, Notes On Church-State Affairs (Malta), 27 J. OF CHURCH & STATE 150, 156
(1985).
19 Id.; REUTERS, Oct. 11, 1984.
60 N.Y. TIMES, OCt. 1, 1984, at A7, col. 2; REUTERS, Oct. 11, 1984.
6 REUTERS, Oct. 1, 1984.
62 REUTERS, Oct. 4, 1984; N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1984, at A9, col. 5.
" REUTERS, Mar. 20, 1985.
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Following direct negotiations between the Maltese government and the
Vatican, an agreement was finally reached in April 1985. The settlement
provides that Catholic schools will phase out all tuition charges over the
next four years, beginning in September 1985 with free tuition at church-
operated secondary schools. Thus, by September 1988 all primary and
secondary Catholic schools will be free. In addition, the agreement pro-
vides that:
(1) the Catholic Church will be allowed to collect voluntary contributions
designated for educational purposes;
(2) a joint church-state commission will decide the portion of each private
school budget to be paid by the Church and the state;
(3) admission at Catholic secondary schools will be by national examination
administered jointly by the Church and the state; and
(4) religious schools will comply with general state education laws, but retain
separate administration as well as their Catholic identity and teaching."
The Roman Catholic Church was moved in part to make these conces-
sions in order to restore direct state funding for its schools.
Ill. Federal Spending Power and the First Amendment
Although there were private schools in America long before there were
public schools, in the nineteenth century primary and secondary educa-
tion came to be understood as principally the duty of local and state
government. Occasionally litigation has broken out when educational
bureaucrats have sought to assert some regulatory control over
nongovernment schools pursuant to this authority to act on behalf of the
public's interest in an educated citizenry.6 5 As of late these disputes have
involved Christian fundamentalists and Amish schools," as opposed to
mainline Protestant and Roman Catholic schools who have voiced no ob-
jection to (indeed, have often eagerly sought) laws requiring school ac-
creditation, teacher certification, and the like.6 7 Moreover, because of
first amendment interpretations banning many forms of aid to religious
schools,6 8 these legal flareups with fundamentalist and Amish schools
64 REUTERS, Apr. 27, 28, 1985.
" See, e.g., Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927) (Japanese parents have right to direct
education of their child including selection of linguistic and cultural aspects thereof); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (same; selection of parochial school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923) (same; selection of foreign language study by German parents).
" See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and cases cited supra note 18.
" Roman Catholic and mainline Protestant schools have not entirely avoided entanglements with
federal administrators including some that had to be sorted out in the courts. See, e.g., St. Martin
Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772 (1981) (federal unemployment taxes assessed
against church-affiliated schools); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979)
(federal regulation of collective bargaining activities of teachers at religious schools).
" At the primary and secondary level, as a general rule the Supreme Court has invalidated public
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have not raised the issue concerning the scope of regulatory power that is
tied to the government's authority to financially aid these religious
schools. Indeed, the legal question could never arise so long as the
United States Supreme Court continued to interpret the first amendment
as prohibiting most forms of parochial school aid.
The Supreme Court's 1982-83 term witnessed the first real doctrinal
break from the ban on government aid to primary and secondary
religious schools. In sustaining Minnesota's tuition tax deduction plan in
Mueller v. Allen, 69 the Court sought to distinguish prior cases on prin-
cipally two bases. First, the choice of "spending" the tax benefit on
religious schooling, as opposed to choosing a free public school or a
tuition-charging nonreligious school, rests entirely in the hands of the
taxpayer-parents."0 Not only did the aid avoid placing the state and
religious schools in direct contact, but parents were not mere unthinking
conduits for the channeling of public aid to religion by indirect means.
"[U]nder Minnesota's arrangement public funds become available only
as a result of numerous, private choices of individual parents of school-
age children,"'" observed the Court. Thus, the statute in Mueller was
likened to the familiar tax deduction for charitable contributions, in-
cluding donations to religious organizations, that is not thought to
violate the establishment clause.72 Second, the tax benefit was available
aid to religious schools in the form of direct monetary transfers and aid in the form of equipment,
services, or reimbursement for same where the equipment or services could possibly be diverted to a
sectarian use. Thus, the Court struck down government aid in Aguilar v. Felton, __ U.S. __
105 S.Ct. 3232 (1985) (public school teachers providing remedial education and attendant materials
at religious school campus); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, - U.S. __, 105 S.Ct. 3216
(1985) (public school teachers providing classes on secular subjects at religious school campus);
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (field trips and instructional equipment); Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349 (1975) (counseling and special education services provided at religious school campus;
loan of instructional equipment); Committee for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756 (1973) (grants for building maintenance; tuition grants to parents; tuition tax credits);
Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (tuition reimbursement); Levitt v. Committee for Public Educ.
and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973) (reimbursement for cost of teacher-prepared testing and
record keeping required by law); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (teacher salary supple-
ment; cash reimbursement for textbooks).
The Supreme Court has upheld state aid to primary and secondary religious schools in Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (tuition tax deductions); Committee for Public Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S.
646 (1980) (subsidy for state-prepared testing and record keeping required by law); Wolman v.
Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (textbooks; standardized tests and scoring services; diagnostic services
on campus with therapeutic services to follow off campus if indicated); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349 (1975) (loan of textbooks); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (textbooks); Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (school bus transportation).
69 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
70 Id. at 399-400.
,, Id. at 399. This "parental choice" feature of Mueller was the basis for distinguishing it from
the "shared time" program struck down in Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, - U.S. -, 105
S.Ct. 3216, 3229 n.13 (1985).
2 463 U.S. at 396 n. 5. A more apt analogy would be to the child care credit given to working
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to all taxpayer-parents of school-age children, whether the pupils attend-
ed public or nongovernment schools," thus distinguishing the statute
from New York tax legislation earlier struck down by the Court."" This
latter difference is more apparent than real, however, because in applica-
tion the Minnesota statute benefited public school parents very little."
The tuition tax deduction upheld in Mueller did not carry with it
onerous screening requirements for qualifying religious schools.7 6 Min-
nesota did not attempt to use its police power over education to confer
tax benefits on private school parents as a "backdoor" means of con-
trolling religious schools. Accordingly, the question concerning the scope
of government authority that is tied to the power to spend and tax still
lingers. Mueller's validation of aid to religious school parents, however,
makes litigation over this issue imminent.
A. The Religious Liberty Cases
Congress is empowered by the Constitution to raise revenue and to
spend these funds for the general welfare."7 This taxing and spending
power has been broadly construed. 8 What it encompasses is discre-
tionary with Congress," subject to judicial review only when it is deter-
mined that the legislation conflicts with a limitation found elsewhere in
parents filing federal tax returns, even when many of the child care facilities are operated by
religious organizations and weave religious training into their program.
" Id. at 398-399.
7 The prior case most in point is Committee for Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
Nyquist held unconstitutional several New York laws. One statute provided outright tuition grants
to low-income parents that enroll their children in nongovernment schools. Thus, the aid did not
take the form of a tax benefit, although a parent had to file a state tax return to obtain the grant.
Id. at 764. A second statute provided a tuition tax credit based on income only to parents of
children in private schools. Id. at 765-766.
" Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. at 408-411 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (over ninety percent of tuition-
charging schools are religious and approximately ninety-six percent of taxpayers eligible for deduc-
tion enrolled children in religious schools).
", The statute did require that an eligible taxpayer enroll their dependent in a school that "legally
fulfill[s] the state's compulsory attendance laws, which is not operated for profit, and which adheres
to the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq. (1982)] and [Minnesota]
chapter 363." MINN. STAT. § 290.09, subd. 22 (1982). The compulsory schooling law in Minnesota
does not require parents to enroll their child in a state-accredited school. MINN. STAT. ANN. §
120.10, subd. 2 (1961). Chapter 363 of the Minnesota Code prohibits discrimination in employment,
public accommodations, transactions in real property, public services, and the like. MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 363.03 (1967).
17 "The Congress shall have the Power to Lay and Collect Taxes, Duties, Imports, and Excises,
to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare . U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 1.
" United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 64-65 (1936) (what constitutes general welfare has been
"liberally construed to cover anything conducive to national welfare").
" Id.; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976) (refusing a first amendment challenge to matching
fund threshold in Federal Election Campaign Act).
October 1985]
HeinOnline  -- 14 J.L. & Educ. 565 1985
566 Journal of Law & Education
the Constitution such as the first amendment.80
The consolidated cases of Bob Jones University v. United States and
Goldsboro Christian School, Inc. v. United States,8' have already given
the Supreme Court's assent to conditioning federal tax exempt status of
private schools on the absence of racial discrimination in admissions and
other policies toward students. Although the justices were divided on
other issues,82 the Court was unanimous in turning back claims by the
schools that their first amendment religious liberty was denied by the an-
tidiscrimination requirement of the Internal Revenue Service.83 Since
most religious-based schools voluntarily eschew racial discrimination,8 4
the practical effect (as distinct from the significant symbolic implications
for race relations) of Bob Jones and Goldsboro is marginal. It is the legal
principle established by these cases concerning the scope of federal power
that has some in the religious community worried.8 5
Yet another troubling step for religious educators was taken by the
Supreme Court in Grove City College v. Bell.86 Grove City College, a
Presbyterian liberal arts school, sought to maintain its institutional
freedom by refusing all state and federal financial assistance. However,
Grove City College did enroll students that received educational grants
and loans directly from the Department of Education (DOE).8 Because
of this student aid, DOE claimed that Grove City was a "recipient" of
"Federal financial assistance," 8 9 as those terms appear in Title IX of the
Educational Amendments of 1972,90 a statute prohibiting discrimination
80 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 91.
471 U.S. 574 (1983).
82 Id. at 606 (Powell, J., concurring in part) (troubled by power of the Internal Revenue Service);
id. at 612 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (differing statutory interpretation).
Id. at 606 (Powell, J., concurring in part); id. at 622 n. 3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
" Blum, Private Elementary Education in the Inner City, 66 PHI DELTA KAPPA 643 (1985);
Carper, supra note 4, at 142; Doyle, A Din of Inequity: Private Schools Reconsidered, 18 AM.
EDUC. 11, 12-13 (1982).
85 See, e.g., Kelley, A New Meaning for Tax Exemption, 25 J. OF CHURCH & STATE 415 (1983);
Gavin & Devins, A Tax Policy Analysis of Bob Jones University v. United States, 36 VANDERBILT L.
REV. 1353 (1983); Nixon, A Classic Confrontation-The Jones University and Goldsboro Christian
School Cases, 78 LIBERTY 11 (1983). The primary objection has been to granting the IRS authority
to determine "public policy" and then to deny tax benefits to organizations not aligned with the
IRS's orthodoxy. Indeed, Justice Powell shared this very concern about a possible abusive role by
the IRS and the sweeping language of the majority's opinion being subject to just such an applica-
tion. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. at 606 (Powell, J., concurring).
6___ U.S. __, 104 S.Ct. 1211 (1984).
Id. at 1214; id. at 1223 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
88 Id. at 1214.
8I Id. at 1215.
90 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (1982). The Title IX regulations are codified at 34 C.F.R. pt.
106 (1985). "Federal financial assistance" is defined in 34 C.F.R. § 106.2(g)(1) (1985) to include:
A grant or loan of Federal financial assistance, including funds made available for:
(ii) Scholarships, loans, grants, wages or other funds extended to any entity for pay-
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on the basis of sex in post-secondary educational institutions. When
DOE requested the college to execute an Assurance of Compliance,9"
school officials refused and a lawsuit ensued.92 The Supreme Court held
that the student aid was federal financial assistance to the college, even
though paid directly to the students,93 and that the college's student
financial aid program was subject to Title IX.9 '
Of greater interest for present purposes was Grove City College's final
argument: that conditioning federal financial assistance on compliance
with Title IX violates the first amendment rights of both its students and
the college.95 The Court summarily brushed aside the defense:
Congress is free to attach reasonable and unambiguous conditions to federal
financial assistance that educational institutions are not obligated to accept.
[Citation omitted.] Grove City may terminate its participation in the [student
aid] program and thus avoid the requirements. . . Students affected by the
Department's action may either take their [federal aid] elsewhere or attend
Grove City without federal financial assistance.96
On its face, the Grove City decision appears to hold that federal
spending power supersedes first amendment rights that in other cir-
cumstance would provide a colorable defense to excessive governmental
interference. Conceivably, then, acquiescence by religious schools to
federal assistance, even when that assistance is given indirectly through
grants to students or their parents, could shackle religious schools to an
unwelcome host of federal regulations. By analogy, other antidiscrimina-
tion legislation presently tied to federal spending power such as Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (race, color and national origin),9" Section
ment to or on behalf of students admitted to that entity or extended directly to such
students for payment to that entity.
A "recipient" is defined in 34 C.F.R. § 106.2(h) (1985) to include:
[Alny public or private agency, institution, or organization, or other entity, or any per-
son, to whom Federal financial assistance is extended directly or indirectly or through
another recipient, and which operates an education program or activity which receives or
benefits from such assistance ....
, An Assurance of Compliance is required by 34 C.F.R. § 106.4 (1985). If Grove City College
had signed the assurance, it would have agreed to
[clomply, to the extent applicable to it, with Title IX ... and all applicable requirements
imposed by or pursuant to the Department's regulation ... to the end that . . . no person
shall, on the basis of sex, be . . . subjected to discrimination under any education pro-
gram or activity for which [it] receives or benefits from Federal financial assistance from
the Department.
Grove City, __ U.S. __, 104 S.Ct. at 1215.
92 Id.
" Id. at 1216-1220.
9, Id. at 1220-1222.
11 Id. at 1223.
"6 Id.
97 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. (1982).
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504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (handicap),98 and the Age
Discrimination Act of 1975, 9' would automatically come to bear on
religious schools.
The Grove City decision must be probed deeper, however. Although
Grove City College is a Presbyterian school, it did not argue any first
amendment religious liberty defenses. Section 901(a)(3) of Title IX' °° ex-
empts religious educational institutions having religious tenets contrary
to the thrust of Title IX. Presumably Grove City College did not rely on
this statutory exemption because it had no religious tenet requiring sex
discrimination. It must not be assumed, however, that the exemption in §
901(a)(3) exhausts the full scope of the first amendment's protection of
religious liberty of church-related schools.'' Since the institutional in-
tegrity of Grove City College in fulfilling its religious mission, however
perceived, was never placed in issue, it is not possible to say what the
Court's disposition would have been if the case presented a clear clash of
federal spending power versus the first amendment liberty of the college.
For example, the Court would have an altogether different case if the
regulation intruded into the college's educational curricula where in-
tegrated with religious beliefs.
Grove City is an unsatisfactory case from which to draw general prin-
ciples for an additional reason. Many religious schools voluntarily prac-
tice policies against discrimination on the bases of race, national origin,
and sex. Indeed, no one accused Grove City College of sex discrimina-
tion and the school had an internal policy against it.' 2 Rather, the case
was simply over whether Title IX in principle applied to the college. It is
unlikely that antidiscrimination legislation will ever be the vehicle for
hampering in any real or material way the educational philosophy of a
religious school as evidenced by altered curricula or teaching
methodology.' 03
" 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
- 42 U.S.C. § 6101 et seq. (1982).
100 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3) (1982).
"' See Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference with Religious
Organizations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347 (1984).
02 Grove City, U.S. at - , 104 S.Ct. at 1224 (Powell, J., concurring).
But see Dayton Christian Schools v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, prob. juris. noted, 54
U.S.L.W. 3323 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1985) (No. 85-488) (dictum suggesting that state services and tax ex-
empt status may be constitutionally withheld for refusal of fundamentalist Christian school to com-
ply with law against sex discrimination in employment of teachers); Under 21 v. City of New York,
108 App. Div. 2d 250, 488 N.Y.S.2d 669, rev. on other grounds, 65 N.Y.2d 344, 492 N.Y.S.2d 522
(1985) (withholding city money for social services from religious organizations that refuse to sign
compliance form that prohibits employment discrimination against homosexuals does not violate
Constitution); Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 496 A.2d 567, vacated and set for reargu-
ment, 496 A.2d 587 (D.C. Ct. App. 1985) (en banc) (church-related university must comply with or-
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Accordingly, Grove City cannot be taken as a clear sign that first
amendment rights may be bulldozed aside by federal taxing and spending
power. Fairly stated, Grove City holds that the acceptance of federal
assistance by a private school, even when the aid is indirect, con-
comitantly entails relinquishing part of the autonomy the school other-
wise enjoys from federal regulation. Although some autonomy is lost,
the degree of first amendment rights still retained is not at all certain,
beyond the specific case of federal antidiscrimination legislation.' 0 4
B. The Freedom of Expression Cases
First amendment expressional rights entail the freedoms of speech,
press, assemblage, and petition. 105 When an individual has a clearly
recognized expressional right to engage in certain activity, the Supreme
Court has consistently held that the government does not violate the con-
stitution if it declines to make easier the exercise of that expression by
refusing to subsidize the desired activity.' 6 The difficult issue arises when
dinance that prohibits discrimination against homosexuals even though homosexuality contrary to
church tenet).
See also the vigorous debate that attends the Civil Rights Restoration Act, H.R. 700, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1985). The bill would preclude federally-funded post-secondary institutions, including
religious colleges, from discrimination on the basis of sex, race, age or handicap. Some are concern-
ed that its provisions are so overly broad that, for example, it might require a Catholic College to
treat abortion the same as the disabilities in student health benefit programs. Religious Right Delays
Civil Rights Bill in Congress, 38 CHURCH & STATE 171 (1985); Washington Observations, 40 REPORT
FROM THE CAPTIAL 3 (1985).
,o Consider the distinction drawn by the Supreme Court in Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160
(1976). Runyon held that the Reconstruction era civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982), pro-
hibited private schools from discrimination on the basis of race. The school authorities argued that
compelling private schools to admit black students violated the first amendment right of freedom of
association and the parental right to direct the upbringing of their children including their educa-
tion. The Court rejected these defenses. Although acknowledging that these rights exist, the Court
held that they were not violated by the antidiscrimination statute. For example, these private schools
could continue to teach that racial segregation is desirable; but it did not follow that the schools had
a first amendment right to place that belief into practice by excluding minorities enrolling
altogether. Thus, the schools remained presumptively free to inculcate whatever values or standards
the schools or parents deem desirable. 427 U.S. at 175-179. Runyon, accordingly, does not require
segregationist academies to alter their curricula or educational philosophy. Admittedly, inability to
act on their segregationist beliefs when it comes to admissions does place constraints on these
schools. On the other hand, it is unlikely that many minority parents will enroll their children in
schools that inculcate belief in division of the races. The principal virtue of the result in Runyon is
symbolic: racist academies may not exist, though people retain the right to believe in them. See
Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (by 7 to 6 vote sus-
taining racial antidiscrimination mandate of § 1981 in religious schools).
,' "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
,O Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959) (lobbying activities did not have to be tax
deductible business expense even if protected first amendment activity); see Harris v. McRae, 448
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government elects to fund an activity, but conditions the aid by imposing
limits on the recipient's expressional activity. The two principal cases ad-
dressing this point evidence ambivalence by the Court toward a rule of
'unconstitutional conditions" in taxing and spending power cases. 107
In Regan v. Taxation With Representation,'°8 a nonprofit corporation
(TWR) had as its chief purpose the influencing of congressional tax
legislation.' 9 Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code'10 grants
tax-exempt status to nonprofit organizations, provided that lobbying
does not comprise a substantial portion of their activity."' A nonprofit
organization that engages in considerable lobbying may register with the
IRS under § 501(c)(4)."12 Because it is nonprofit, a § 501(c)(4) organiza-
tion does not pay federal income tax, but its donors may not deduct their
contributions on their individual federal tax returns."' However, the tax
code allows a § 501(c)(4) organization to affiliate with a § 501(c)(3) cor-
poration. The § 501(c)(4) affiliate may lobby without impairing the tax-
exempt status of the parent organization, so long as separate financial
records are kept including whether donations were received by the parent
or by the non-exempt affiliate." 4
The Court had previously held that lobbying is an expressional activity
protected by the first amendment. "I TWR brought this action seeking to
obtain both tax-exempt status and the freedom to engage in substantial
lobbying without being disqualified from a § 501(c)(3) exemption.
The Court upheld the statutory restriction on lobbying activity. The
tax deduction accorded to donors of § 501(c)(3) organizations was viewed
U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding Hyde Amendment, which denied federal funding of abortions, even
though activity is protected by first amendment).
"' See generally Brewster, Does the Constitution Care About Coercive Federal Funding?, 34
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1 (1983); Westen, Incredible Dilemmas: Conditioning One Constitutional
Right on the Forfeiture of Another, 66 IOWA L. REV. 741 (1981); O'Neil, Unconstitutional Condi-
tions: Welfare Benefits With Strings Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 443 (1966); Willcox, Invasions of
the First Amendment Through Conditioned Public Spending, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 12 (1955); Hale,
Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 321 (1935); Merrill, Un-
constitutional Conditions, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 879 (1929); Comment, Constitutional Spending
Power, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 293 (1975); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595
(1960).
08 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
Io d. at 541-542.
110 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982).
. Id. ("no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise at-
tempting to influence legislation").
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4) (1982).
26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) (1982) (individual may generally deduct up to thirty percent of ad-
justed gross income in contributions to § 501(c)(3) organizations).
'" Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. at 544; id. at 552-553 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
.. Eastern Railroad Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137-138 (1961);
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 625 (1954).
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as an "indirect subsidy" that Congress had the power to grant or
withhold. By denying tax-exempt status to legislation-influencing groups,
the Court characterized the congressional act as simply a refusal to sub-
sidize lobbying with public funds, a legitimate exercise of its spending
and taxing powers."'6
A concurring opinion by three justices appended what turned out to be
an important refinement. If a § 501(c)(3) organization was prohibited
from creating its own § 501(c)(4) affiliate for lobbying purposes, the con-
curring justices believed the tax provision would violate the first amend-
ment. Because they understood the restriction to only prevent tax deduct-
ible contributions from being spent on lobbying, the concurring justices
accepted the constitutionality of § 501(c)(3).117
More recently in FCC v. League of Women Voters,"8 the Court sided
with expressional rights over the spending power. The case called into
question the constitutionality of § 399 of the Public Broadcasting Act of
1967."9 The act created the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB),
with the purpose of dispersing funds to noncommercial broadcasting sta-
tions to partially defray their operational and programming expenses.
Section 399 prohibits stations receiving CPB grants from airing opinions
or editorials on public issues.'20 Pacifica, whose station-licensees were
receiving CPB subsidies, brought suit challenging the ban on editorializ-
ing.' 12 '
Although the government raised several defenses, of particular interest
here is the government's final argument. Citing Taxation With Repre-
sentation, the Department of Justice maintained that § 399 was simply an
exercise by Congress in refraining from spending public money that
would effectively subsidize Pacifica's editorials.' 22 The Supreme Court,
however, distinguished § 399 from the § 501(c)(3) restriction on lobbying
upheld in Taxation With Representation. Section 399 totally barred a sta-
tion from editorializing if it received any CPB funds. Because a noncom-
mercial station cannot segregate its funding by source, it is even barred
from using funds from private donors to produce and broadcast
Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. at 544, 546.
' Id. at 552-554 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
__ U.S. ., 104 S.Ct. 3106 (1984).
,, Communications Act of 1934, § 399 as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 399 (1982).
120 Section 399 provides:
No noncommercial educational broadcasting station which receives a grant
from the Corporation [for Public Broadcasting] under subpart C of this part
may engage in editorializing. No noncommercial educational broadcasting sta-
tion may support or oppose any candidate for public office.
104 U.S. at 3113.
,22 Id. at 3127-3128.
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editorials. 23 Thus, FCC v. League of Women Voters adopts the caveat
in the concurring opinion of Taxation With Representation as the
distinguishing principle. Plainly, § 399 would be constitutional if the act
was amended to permit noncommercial stations to establish privately
funded affiliates that could produce and air editorials.' 4
Taxation With Representation reaffirms the rule that "the government
may not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a constitutional
right."' 25 That is to say, Congress cannot have as its legislative purpose
the suppression of first amendment rights. These cases also reject the
argument that because Congress has the power to grant or deny a subsidy
(or tax benefit), it thereby has the unfettered power to attach conditions
that impinge-even unintentionally-on first amendment rights. '26
Finally, alternative outlets for the exercise of first amendment rights that
are unintentionally restrained by federal taxing or spending legislation
must be palpable and meaningful.' 27 Beyond these outer parameters, it is
difficult to generalize from these two cases concerning the future path of
constitutional law. Predicting the outcome of litigation concerning the
exercise of government direction, supervision, or control over the cur-
riculum, program of instruction, administration, or personnel of a
religious school, tied to the acceptance of federal aid, will have to await
future case development.
IV. Conclusion
Whether access to government funding could be the means whereby a
host of unwanted and obtrusive regulations come to bear on America's
religious schools cannot be determined with certainty from this study.
Admittedly the historical, social, and political circumstances in Europe
differ from those in the United States, and these lessons learned
elsewhere are not transferable to America without qualification. Never-
theless, government funding in Spain, France, and Malta was the
mechanism by which those governments worked to extend control over
church-related schools-controls which went far beyond issues of health,
fire, safety, and minimal literacy. The possibility that a similar pattern
could occur in the United States cannot be easily dismissed knowing what
"I Id. at 3128.
121 Id.
,25 461 U.S. at 545. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (forbade withholding of state
college teaching job because of exercising free speech); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)
(striking down state law requiring anyone who sought property tax exemption to sign declaration
that he did not advocate forcible overthrow of government).
,2' FCC v. League of Women Voters, - U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. at 3128.
2 d.; Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. at 552-554 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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has transpired in these other Western democracies. If the present political
climate in America is perceived as favoring considerable autonomy for
religious schools, then who can say how things might be fifteen or twenty
years from now should nongovernment schools become financially
dependent on federal aid.
The status of the case law in the Supreme Court concerning congres-
sional spending and taxing power versus first amendment rights is inade-
quately developed at present. Accordingly, it is speculative to say
whether the first amendment provides sure protection for the
philosophical integrity of religious schools should they begin receiving
substantial government aid. It should not go unnoticed that those justices
on the Supreme Court that are most inclined to uphold aid to religious
schools are the same judges who are unwaivering in sustaining federal
taxing and spending power in the face of claimed first amendment viola-
tions.' 28 The operative principle followed by these justices appears to be
a less "activist" approach to individual liberties and greater deference to
the will of the majority as evidenced in legislation. Thus, any future con-
servative trend as a result of personnel changes on the Supreme Court ac-
tually heightens the danger that the diverse character of religious school-
ing cannot be guaranteed by the first amendment. Unless safeguards for
shielding the educational freedom of religious schools are written into the
funding (or tax benefit) legislation, acceptance of federal benefits could
compromise the very schools in which so much effort is presently being
invested to insure their continued vitality.
28 Justice Rehnquist who authored the opinion in Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461
U.S. 540 (1983), and filed a vigorous dissent in FCC v. League of Women Voters, __ U.S. __
104 S.Ct. 3106, 3129 (1984), wrote the majority opinion in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983),
and dissented in the most recent parochial school cases that denied the constitutionality of govern-
ment aid programs, Aguilar v. Felton, __ U.S. __, 105 S.Ct. 3232, 3243 (1985), and Grand
Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, __ U.S. __, 105 S.Ct. 3216, 3231 (1985). Justice White who wrote
the majority opinion in Grove City College v. Bell, __ U.S. __, 104 S.Ct. 1211 (1984), con-
sistently dissents in cases denying aid to religious schools (e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
661 (1971)), and authored the opinion of the Court in Committee for Public Education & Religious
Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (upholding reimbursement to religious schools of expense of
performing testing and reporting services required by law). Chief Justice Burger, the author of Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States and Goldsboro Christian School, Inc. v. United States, 463 U.S. 388
(1983), has of late been a frequent dissenter in cases refusing parochial aid (e.g., Aquilar v. Felton,
- U.S. __, 105 S.Ct. 3232, 3242 (1985) ).
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*The dates for enrollment year varies depending on the source and the date indicated in parenthesis.
**Merged with National Christian School Association and Ohio Association of Christian Schools in
1978 to become the Association of Christian Schools International.
Sources: R. Abramowitz & S. Rosenfeld, eds., DECLINING ENROLLMENTS: THE CHALLENGE OF THE
COMING DECADE (1978). The 1980-85 data came from telephone conversations with D.
Crum, Senior and Special Assistant to the Education Assistant for Private Education,
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